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INTRODUCTION: PRAISING WITH 
FAINT DAMNATION-THE TROUBLING 
REHABILITATION OF KOREMATSU 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
It is my great pleasure to introduce this joint symposiuin issue of 
the Boston College Law Review and the Boston College Third World Law 
Joumal. The articles printed here represent part of a spectacular day-
long program entitIed The Long Shadow of Korematsu which took place 
at Boston College Law School on October 3, 1998, during the fifth 
annual Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty. Thanks are 
owed to all tIlOse at Boston College Law School who supported tile 
conference and symposium, particularly Dean James Rogers. Special 
tIlanks must also be given to Aviam Soifer, who generously backed tile 
first Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty when it was just 
an idea, and graced tile fiftll Conference as a speaker. 
In 1942, tile United States interned 110,000 Japanese Amelicans.1 
These people were forced to leave tIleir homes, businesses, jobs and 
communities despite never being formally charged WitIl any civil or 
criminal offense. The government's justification for this was simple 
and chilling: tile ancestry of Japanese Americans made tIlem likely to 
side wi til Japan during World War II. To tIleir credit, some Japanese 
Americans challenged internment in the' courts. Their efforts failed, 
however, when tl1e United States Supreme Court upheld tile constitu-
tionality of internment in' tile case of Koremats1.l v. United States.2 
History has properly judged tile Korematsu case harshly because it 
memorializes tile Supreme Court's complicity in tIlis gross \-iolation of 
::: Professor of Lau~ Boston College Lau' Sellool. The author would like to thank Keith Aoki 
for his assistance in organizing the Conference of Asian Pacific Amelican law Faculty, and Sumi 
Cho and Dean Hashimoto for their efforts and assistance in putting the symposium on Korematsll 
togethel~ Frank Wu deserves credit for blinging the essay discllssed herein to the author's 
attention, and Kalin Yen, Sharon Beckman and I1ana Hurwitz provided ,-aluable comments. 
1 SUCHENG CHAN, AsIAN AMERICANS, AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 122 (1991). The use of the 
tenn japanese Amelicans" is meant to include both Amelican citizens of Japanese descent and 
resident aliens of Japanese descent. I include the resident aliens nithin the term japanese 
Amelicans" because many resident aliens of Japanese descent would hm'e become naturalized 
Amelican citizens but for the explicit legal prohibition against their doing so. See illJilznote 20 
and accompan}ing text. . 
2323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hiraba}-ashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding 
application of cm'fellT order against Japanese Amelicans). 
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consitutional and human rights. The subsequent clearing of Fred Kore· 
matsu's criminal record3 and the payment of reparations to the victims 
of internmen t 1 stand as evidence that the U.S. government acknO\v· 
ledges the terrible injustice it inflicted on Japanese Americans. This 
suggests that Korematsu has been permanently discredited; a mistake 
never to be repeated. 
Unfortunately, proclamations of Korematsu ~ permanent discredit· 
ing are premature. The Supreme Court has never overruled the case. 
It stands as valid precedent, an autllOritative interpretation of our 
. Constitution and the "supreme Law of the Land.";; While modern 
courts continue to cite Korematsu, critical references to it are noticeably 
rare.6 Moreover, it is easy to confuse the healing of wounds brought 
on by the passage of time with acceptance of what happened more 
than fifty years ago. If our society forgets internment's misery and 
injustice, tlle Korematsu case may come to be viewed as one of those 
unfortunate, but necessary, compromises that "wasn't all tlIat bad." 
Even if those who openly support the internment remain few in num· 
ber? tllOse who (to turn a familiar phrase upside down) "praise it with 
faint damnation" are likely to increase, thereby making it respectable 
to overlook, or even deny, tlle racism that made internment possible. 
This only heightens the chance that our country will someday intern 
innocent civilians once again.s 
A prime example of the way in which Korematsu may be "praised 
with faint damnation" is a recent essay by no less than the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist. In When 
the Laws were Silent,!) the Chief Justice consi~ers the internment and 
:I Korematstl v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Korematsu Coram Nobis"); 
see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th CiI: 1987) (affirming vacation of Hira· 
ba)"ashi's cOll\iction for "iolating cm·few). 
~ See 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (Civil Liberties Act of 1988, autholizing payment of reparations 
to japanese Americans); CHAN, supra note 1, at 173-74 (recounting histor)' of reparations 
legislation) • 
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 1 (refel'ling to the Constitution as the "supreme Law of the Land"). 
G A Key Cite (Westlaw) search reveals 1964 documents citing the Korematsll opinion. Of these 
citations, only 2 is identified as critical or negative histol1'. Similarly, a Shepard's search on "~stlaw 
reveals 534 judicial citations to Korematsu. Of these cites, only 2 are marked as "questioned." 
Finally, aLexis Amo-cite search idenitifies only one case that "criticizes" Korematstl. 
7 For a discussion of those who still openly support the internment, see Robert Ito, Con em-
tmticJn Camp or Sim/mer Camp?, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 15, 1998, available at <http://bsd.mo-
jones.cpm/ncws_,dre/ito.html>. . 
8 See Korell/atsll, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson,j., disscnting) (referring to Korematsu as a "loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any autholity that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need. EVC1T repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and t1linking and expands 
it to new purposes."). 
9"\\'illiam H. Rchnquist, Wlzm the Laws ~l~re Silent, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 77-8~. This 
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the criticisms advanced against the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice 
never endorses the internment, nor does he claim that the Korematsu 
decision was unproblematic. At the same time, however, the Chief 
Justice is curiously muted in his criticism of the internment and those 
responsible for it 
Consider the ChiefJustice?s description of the internment: 
First a curfew was impo$ed on the etlmicJapanese, then tlley 
were required to report to relocation centers, and finally they 
were taken to camps in tlle interior of California and in tlle 
mountain states. There was no physical brutality, but tllere 
were certainly severe hardships: removal from tlle place 
where one lived, often the forced sale of houses and busi-
nesses, and harsh living conditions in the spartan quarters of 
tlle internment centers.IO 
This description of internment contains no glaring inaccuracies, 
yet its language suggests detached indifference. The Chief Justice notes 
tllat "tllere was no physical brutality," but internment is, by definition, 
brutal. Moreover, tlle word "physicar' elides internment's psychological 
brutality. According to the Chief Justice, removal from one's home, the 
forced sale of property (often at prices so low as to be essentially 
confiscatory), and harsh living quarters are only "seyere hardships," 
and not "brutality." 
Admittedly, taken alone, this passage may not deserye the inter-
pretation suggested here. Perhaps I have unnecessarily quibbled over 
tlle connotations of words like "brutality" and "hardship." The rest of 
Rehnquist's essay, however, creates even more discomfort because he 
studiously avoids criticizing every arm of the government responsible 
for internment. 
The Chief Justice defends the military for exaggerating tlle alleged 
tllreat posed by Japanese Americans: 
In defense of the military it should be pointed out that tllese 
officials were "not entrusted Witll tlle protection of anyone's 
civil liberty; tlleir job was making sure tllat vital areas were as 
secure. as possible from espionage or sabotage. The role of 
General DeWitt was not one to encourage a nice calculation 
essa)' appears in similar form as part of the Chief Justice's book. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALI. 
THE L.\WS BUT ONE: Cl\'IL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 184-211 (1998). 
IOId. at 78. 
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of the ~osts in civil liberty as opposed to the benefits to 
national security. I I 
The Chief Justice is similarly kind to Henry Stimson and John 
McCloy, the civilians charged with military oversight as Secretary 
and Assistant Secretary of War respectively. His assertion that these 
men felt no need to defend civil liberties seems odd given the fact 
that Stimson and McCloy took oaths "to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States."12 
The Chief Justice then completely omits.theJustice Department's 
coinplicated role in the internment, especially the behavior of the 
Solicitor General's office. This lapse is particularly unfortunate given 
the Chief Justice's defense of the military. Even if the entire Depart-
ment of "'Tar correctIy felt no obligatiQn to. guard the consitutional 
rights of Japanese Americans, tIlis claim cannot, by mere extension, 
apply to tIle Justice Department, whose function was the enforcement 
of the constitutional rights violated by internment. 
Furthermore, to' tIle extent tIlat tIle case for internment stood on 
distortions about tIle threat posed by Japanese Americans, Justice De-
partment lawyers-including the Solicitor General's office-owed an 
etIlical obligation to correct those falsehoods before tIle Supreme 
Court.13 It is abundantly clear that tlle Solcitor General knew that the 
government's argument to the Supreme Court depended on such 
misrepresentations. Justice Department lawyer Edward Ennis drew the 
Solicitor General's attention to tllese misrepresentations, argued for 
rectification of the factual record, and was overruled.14 It is therefore 
not possible to defend the Justice Department by simply asserting that 
tIle Department (like the military) was simply "doing its job." The 
Chief justice's failure to discuss the Justice Department is significant 
because it creates the impression that nobody in the executive branch 
of government had responsibility for protecting the constitutional 
11 Id. at 86. 
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994) (providing that all those appointed to civil service shall take an 
oath promising "[0 support and defend the Conslitlltion of the United States against all encmies, 
foreign and domestic"); see also United States ex reL Reel v. Bade, 152 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Ch~ 1945) 
(mentioning oath taken under thcn 5 U.S.CA. § 16, from which ule present provision is dedvcd, 
that included the phrase "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States"). 
13 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (4), (5), (6) (1998) 
(prohibiting use of false e\idence); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1998) 
(I'equiling candol' towm'd a tribunal). ' 
14 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 195-206 (1983); see also Korematsu COl'll 1/1 Nobis, 584 F. 
Supp. 1417-19 (describing how the United StatesJustice Department knowingly withheld critical 
information from ule SupI'eme Court); CHAN, sllpra note 1, at 138. 
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rights of Japanese Americans. By extension, it insinuates that the ex-
.ecutive branch of our government, from the military to the Solicitor 
General, behaved correctly by carrying out and defending the intern-
ment of Japanese Americans. 
The Chief Justice's analysis leaves the Supreme Court as the only 
organ of government that might be charged with. responsibility for 
stopping the injustice of internment. Here too, the Chief Justice takes 
great pains to justifY the Court's actions. Indeed, he is far easier on the 
Court than the Justices who dissented in Korematsu. The result is an 
analysis that is both fascinating and troubling. 
The Chief Justice starts with a conventional defense of judicial 
deference to military decision in time ofwar.15 Concluding that judicial 
deference does not bestow unbridled freedom upon the military, the 
Chief Justice considers the argument that internment and the Kore-
nratsu decision were wrong because they·were based on racial distinc-
tions. It is here that the Chief Justice's reluctance to criticize becomes 
most clear. At the outset, he rejects the charge that racism caused 
internment or the Korematsu decision. He writes: 
.The Court's answer to this attack seems satisfactory: Those of 
Japanese descent were displaced because of fear that disloyal 
elements among them would aid Japan in the war: Though 
there were undoubtedly nativists in California who welcomed 
a chance to see the issei and nisei removed, it does not follow 
that this point of view was attributable to the military deci-
sionmakers. They, after all, did not at first propose reloca-
tion.1G 
The inadequacy of this analysis is painful. The Chief Justice believes 
that Japanese Americans were interned because of fear that some 
Japanese Americans were disloyal, and not on account of racism. 
But why would anyone believe Japanese Americans to be di~loyal? 
The obvious answer is "because they're Japanese." The Chief Justice 
therefore skirts perilously close to 'endorsing the argument that 
biological ancestry is rational evidence of political loyalty. H;e stopS 
short of this endorsement, if at all, only by suggesting that the 
federal government could treat aliens of Japanese descent differ-
ently from citizens of Japanese descent. Even here, though, the 
Chief Justice seems curiously untroubled by either internment or 
tile Korematsu majority. 
15 See Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 8i-88. 
IGId. at 88. 
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For example, the Chief Justice answers his own question about the 
constitutionality of interning Japanese-American citizens with the state-
ment "[u]nder today's constitutional law, certainly not."17 The use of 
"to day's" suggests that the internment of U.S. citizens was constitu-
tional when it occurred, and the Chief Justice never clears up this 
di&turbing possibility. Among other things, he states that the fear of 
disloyal Japanese-American citizens "was not wholly groundless. illS He 
th~n writes, "But although such information might well have justified 
exclusion of Uapanese-American citizens] ... from work in aircraft 
factories without strict security clearance, it falls considerably short' of 
justifying the dislodging of thousands of citizens from their homes on 
the basis of ancestry."1!! Notice the change in grammatical tense be-
tween dIe words 'justified" and "falls." By using du; past tense in talking 
about dIe possible justification for treating Japanese-American citizens 
differendy from other citizens, dIe Chief Justice clearly makes a state-
ment about legal outcomes decided in the past. However, by u~ing dIe 
present tense when discussing the lack of justification, he leaves open 
dIe possibility that he is still referring to "today's constitutional law," 
and not yesterday's. 
The Chief Justice'S analysis about the internment of aliens of 
Japanese descent does not fare much better. He justifies dleir intern-
ment20 by referring to the Alien Enemies Law of 1798, which provided 
dlat dIe United States could arrest dIe unnaturalized citizens of coun-
tries with whom dIe United S~tes was at war.21 Leaving aside for the 
moment whether the Alien Enemies Law was itself constitutional or 
just, the Chief Justice'S argument rests problematically on an overly 
blunt distinction between aliens and citizens. Many interned aliens of 
Japanese descent were not American citizens only because naturaliza-
tion was legally restricted "to aliens being free white persons and to 
aliens of Mrican nativity and to persons of Mrican descent."22 The very 
racism discredited by dIe Chief Justice actually lies at dIe core of the 
alien status th~t the Chief Justice relies upon in defending the intern-
ment of aliens of Japanese descent. Nevertheless, he seems untroubled 
17 ld. at 88 (emphasis added). 
ISld. 
19 ld. (emphasis added). 
20 See Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 89. 
21 See id. 
22 Charles J. McClain, Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for AlIIerican CitizelishiP, 
2 AsIAl'> LJ. 33, 35 (1995) (quoting section 2169, Revised Statutes of 1875). This pl"o\ision 
remained unchanged until after the internment. Id. 
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by the idea that racism creates legal distinctions that justify disparate 
legal treatment on the basis of race during time of war: 
There is considerable irony, of course, in relying on pre-
viously existing laws discriminating against Japanese immi-
grants to conclude that .still further disabilities should be 
imposed upon them because they had not been assimilated 
into the Caucasian majority. But in time o{war a nation may 
be required to respond to a condition without making a 
careful inquiry into how that condition came about.23 
The Chief Justice concludes his essay by calling Korematsu "the 
leastjustified"-as opposed to unjustified-curtailment of civil liberty 
during wartime. His words show why it is important for scholars to 
study carefully K01'e11Zatsu and its legal legacy. As noted earlier, the 
passage of time and healing of wounds make it easy to forget the 
injustice of internment. If "it wasn't that bad," the climate becomes 
ripe for rewriting the history that so rightly condemns internment. 
Perhaps the Chief Justice did not intend to rehabilitate KonJ11zatsu. 
Nevertlleless, his reluctance to clearly criticize tlle internment and 
those responsible for it makes rehabilitation more likely. 
Fortunately, tlle articles published h~re provide a powerful coun-
terweight to essays like the Chief Justice's. By speaking out and pub-
lishing, the symposium participants nourish the vitaJly important pro-
ject of making sure tllat our country remembers its history, and does 
not repeat it. As long as these words remain, those who try to defend 
K01'e11latsu must confront scholarly research tllat casts doubt on ~leir 
efforts. We must remember what happened over fifty years ago. Vole 
must remember tllat it was terrible, unjustified, and wrong. 
23 See Rclmquist, slIpra note 9, at 88. 

